The Supreme Court heard a leapfrog appeal relating to the meaning of paragraph 5(4)(c) of Schedule 6 to the Land Registration Act (LRA) 2002.
Background:
On 20 September 2002, Mr. Brown was registered as proprietor of a substantial piece of undeveloped land lying to the West of The Promenade in County Durham. On 8 July 2004, Mr. and Mrs. Ridley were registered as proprietors of land adjoining part of the Brown land to the northeast and west of The Promenade.
The disputed land consists of a strip running from The Promenade along the boundary between the garden of Valley View and the Brown land. That piece was first used as part of their garden and then as part of the site for the erection of a new house. Planning permission for the new house was granted in early 2018. In December 2019, the Ridleys applied to the Land Registry to be registered as the owners of the disputed land on the grounds that they had been in adverse possession of it for the required period as per the LRA 2002. Mr. Brown objected to their application.
The Land Registry referred the matter to the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) which sided with the Ridleys. Mr Brown appealed and won in the Upper Tribunal (UT). The Ridleys appealed to the Supreme Court via the ‘leapfrog’ procedure.
Decision:
The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal and reinstated the FTT ruling that they should be registered as proprietors of a strip of disputed land on the basis of adverse possession. Lord Briggs concluded that paragraph 5(4)(c) of Schedule 6 to the LRA 2002 meant that any ten-year period of reasonable belief was sufficient.
The intention of the LRA was to reduce the scope of adverse possession but it was never to wholly remove it. As the reasonable belief condition was restricted to disputes relating to land close to imprecisely defined boundaries, it was unnecessary to narrowly construe paragraph 5(4)(c). Lord Briggs also rejected Mr. Brown’s interpretation that the adverse possessor should make their application immediately upon the ending of their reasonable belief, as it is unrealistic. Similarly, the de minimis period suggested by Mr. Brown was refused. The respondent’s construction would have had the drastic consequence of making the route to registration provided for by paragraph 5(4)(c) largely illusory.
The Court noted that Zarb v Parry was based on an erroneous assumption that the reasonable belief must exist up to the date of the application, as such interpretation does not take into consideration the ‘any ten years’ construction.
The Court also ruled that the adverse possession regime under the LRA was compliant with Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). It based its conclusion on the fact that the ECHR found the pre-LRA regime compliant in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008).
Implications:
This decision has clarified the period during which an applicant relying upon the boundary condition in paragraph 5(4) of Schedule 6 to the Land Registration Act 2002 must hold a reasonable belief that they own the land they seek to have registered.
Following this judgement, it is now clear that the Court of Appeal in Zarb v Parry was incorrect and that parties do not need to hold the reasonable belief for at least ten years prior to the date of the application.